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Birkbeck College and Imperial College, London  
 
his paper addresses the issue of making sense of 
Kant’s notion of moral worth. Kant’s identification 
in GMM1 I of the good will as the unconditional 
good leads to understanding the moral worth of human 
agency in ways which, some critics claim, is at odds with 
our moral intuitions. By first focusing upon how Kant 
singles out action out of duty as characteristic of the good 
will, we shall show that a covert assumption about our 
nature potentially weakens the force of Kant’s argument. 
This paper claims that this assumption is not needed, and 
proposes an interpretation of Kant’s notion of moral worth 
that dispenses with it. In so doing, the interpretative strategy 
draws upon Kant’s solution to the Third Antinomy, and 
therefore on Transcendental Idealism. 
An analysis of the moral worth of the action of a 
benevolent agent who heeds the requirements of duty will 
show how inclinations contribute to morally worthy action, 
while the action’s moral worth lies in its being motivated by 
duty. A further analysis of the issue of moral worth in the 
light of recent scholarship introduces a distinction between 
the moral worth of the action and of the agent. This provides 
the material to address an important standard criticism of 
Kantian ethics. The paper concludes by suggesting that the 
proposed interpretation is required to make proper sense of 
Kant’s indirect duty to develop compassionate inclinations. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In the paper, GMM refers to the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 
MM to the Metaphysics of Morals, CPR to the Critique of Pure Reason, 
CPrR to the Critique of Practical Reason, and CJ to the Critique of 
Judgement. AA refers the the Akademie Ausgabe edition of Kant’s works. 
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A. 
A Practical Conception of the Self 
 
Kant’s argument in GMM I 
 
ant’s conception of moral worth is first presented in 
abstract form with the notion of the good will as the 
only unconditional good (GMM:392-4). What 
Kant means by ‘unconditional good’ is: ‘of absolute worth’ 
(GMM:394), but also: ‘intrinsically good’. Indeed Lewis 
(1983) characterises intrinsic properties as properties (i) a 
thing has in virtue of the way that thing itself, and nothing 
else, is; and (ii) properties that depend only on that thing. 
Correspondingly, we find Kant characterising the good will 
as the only good which is both (i) good in itself (unlike a 
conditional good, GMM:393-4), and (ii) independently of 
everything else (unlike happiness, GMM:393;395-6). This 
notion then gets specified for human beings, i.e. beings 
endowed with reason, but also with a sensuous nature, in the 
form of duty (GMM:397). In the developments leading to 
the introduction of duty, Kant sets out the chief features of 
morally worthy action. 
If the intrinsicality of the goodness of the good will is its 
defining characteristic, the actions it produces must bear the 
same characteristics in terms of their moral worth. From (i), 
this moral worth must display an independence from 
anything else, i.e. from how any empirical state of affairs 
might happen to be. From (ii), their being good must not be 
the result of any accidental relations. 
Let us examine condition (i). When viewed in time, an 
action is triggered under certain initial conditions, and its 
implementation results in new states of affairs (conse-
quences). Considering consequences first, the independence 
condition entails that the moral worth of the action cannot 
depend upon the states of affairs brought about by this 
K 
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action. This means an independence of actualised conse-
quences (GMM:399).2  
Focusing now upon triggering conditions, these empirical 
states of affairs can be of outer or inner sense. Kant does not 
say anything about outer, i.e. physical (in a broad sense), 
states of affairs. Clearly, a particular action depends upon 
what it is physically possible to do in the particular 
circumstances the agent finds herself. The goodness of an 
action cannot, however, be dependent upon its “physical 
make-up”. This is important for GMM II as it shows why 
the agent’s subjective principle, or maxim, of action, that is 
to be tested for its moral worth, must be general3 (see 
Kuehn, 2009), and refer to a type of action that can be 
instantiated in different “physical” circumstances. 
What Kant does refer to, are circumstances of inner sense, 
i.e. psychological factors: the moral worth of the good will’s 
actions must not depend upon the presence of psycho-
logically favourable circumstances, or the absence of 
psychologically unfavourable ones (GMM:397-398). We 
shall examine this below. 
These negative characterisations expound the sense in 
which the moral worth of the good will’s actions is 
independent of circumstances. Since, according to condition 
(ii) above, it must also not be accidental that they are good, 
they must therefore be done because they are good and only 
for the reasons that make them good. This is how Kant 
arrives at the conclusion that the actions of the good will are 
those the agent does out of duty (GMM: 397). 
If this characterises the agency of the good will, to 
understand how to apportion moral worth to actions, we 
must examine what is meant by independence of favourable 
and unfavourable (psychological) circumstances.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This is a feature which Kant examines once the concept of duty is already in 
place, together with intended consequences. It is noteworthy that actualised	  
consequences could already be excluded as bestowing moral worth at this 
stage of the analysis, while intended ones could not.  
3 On the whole, ‘principle’ seems more appropriate to reflect this generality 
than ‘maxim’. This is, of course, not how Kant uses these words, hence I 
shall keep both in the remainder of the paper (see Onof, 1998). 
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Inner sense is defined by Kant as that ‘by means of which 
the mind intuits itself, or its inner state’ (A22/B37), and 
about which he further states that ‘all representations (…) as 
determinations of the mind themselves belong to the inner 
state’ (A34/B50). Such representations must be able to be 
accompanied by the ‘I think’ else they ‘would be nothing to 
me’ (B132). So these states of inner sense (which define 
what I have called psychological circumstances) are 
cognitive ones. What is at stake here is therefore what the 
agent believes, and the claim is that the moral worth of an 
action is independent of such beliefs.  
What kind of beliefs could be relevant? They could either 
be (i) beliefs about empirical states of affairs that define 
what my duty is in the specific situation; (ii) or beliefs about 
what I ought to do. As regards the second, the knowledge of 
what morality commands is, for Kant, accessible to every 
man (GMM: 404). As a result, the possibility of a depend-
ence of moral worth upon such beliefs is not practically 
relevant. As for the first type of beliefs, Kant does not 
address the issue, which suggests he takes it as obvious that 
moral worth is independent of such beliefs. To support that, 
one can note that he mentions ‘ignorance’ as a subjective 
condition (GMM: 42 fn) featuring in the maxim. What is at 
stake is whether the maxim conforms to universal law: this 
is therefore independent of how much truth there is among 
the agent’s beliefs about the world. 
 
 
Inclinations and the practical notion of self 
 
ut there is arguably more to psychological circum-
stances in inner sense. After all, our representations 
originate in affections of our senses, and these 
sensations may also be considered insofar as they refer to the 
subject, rather than the object. This happens when consider-
ing the determination of ‘feeling of pleasure or displeasure’ 
(CJ: 206). That is, with these sensations, inclinations are 
manifested insofar as their object ‘is [or not] regarded as an 
B 
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object of our liking’ (CJ: 206): ‘the agreeable produces an 
inclination’ (CJ: 207). Since Kant’s discussion in GMM I is 
devoted to the moral relevance of the presence or absence of 
morally favourable inclinations (e.g. GMM: 393), it would 
therefore seem apposite to include their presence or absence 
among the psychological circumstances of an action. And 
indeed, when Kant examines a sympathetic disposition, this 
is apparently viewed as only circumstantial to the agent’s 
action: such dispositions form no integral part of the agent 
(GMM: 398).4 
This interpretation of inclinations as psychological cir-
cumstances would however seem to commit Kant to a view 
of the self which many are likely to dispute. Williams (1973: 
207-9) raises a well-known objection, namely that there are 
certain ‘categorical desires’ characterising the self, without 
which one would not be who one is. He thereby builds upon 
a Hegelian conception of character (Wood: 1990). It would 
seem that here, there is a metaphysical choice to be made, 
and that this will lead to one of two different kinds of ethics. 
That is, it seems that in GMM I, Kant is already implicitly 
relying upon the metaphysical claim that we are defined 
exclusively by our rationality. Does this mean that GMM I is 
dogmatically wedded to such a notion of human beings, 
which would weaken its broad appeal? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 In this paper, I focus upon morally favourable inclinations. Unfavourable 
inclinations are then inclinations not to do what is one’s duty. Their absence 
does not require a separate examination from that of the presence of 
favourable ones. Indeed, consider that a moral agent is always experiencing 
inclinations. This can be seen from Kant’s empirical account of agency (see 
further in the paper). Consider two agents, agent A who is experiencing an 
inclination against, e.g. helping another, and agent B who is not experiencing 
any inclination in favour of helping another. B is in fact experiencing other 
inclinations. What B’s lack of inclination towards helping the other denotes is 
in effect a balance of his inclinations towards not helping. This is not 
different in kind from a specific inclination against helping. Ultimately, what 
counts in the belief-desire model that we are assuming for the empirical 
account of agency (see further in the paper), is the relative strength of 
inclinations. A balance of inclinations away from duty can thus be achieved 
either with a strong inclination against doing the morally right thing, or with 
a lack of any inclination towards doing it, coupled with inclinations to doing 
other things.  
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Admittedly, Kant’s task in GMM I is not to give a solid 
philosophical foundation to the a priori truth of his claims; 
the task is rather an interpretation of common moral ideas. 
Nevertheless, the aim of such an interpretation should be to 
reach out to as many readers as possible.5 One therefore has 
to ask whether Kant requires this understanding of the self.6 
 
he question is whether there is any room to accommodate 
some of the concerns of the Hegel-Williams criticisms? I 
want to suggest that there is. Namely, it is possible to accept 
that the desires we act upon can be viewed as contributing to 
defining who we are in a practical sense.7 With this picture 
of the self, we shall then show how desires can be seen to 
contribute to morally worthy agency. So, although I shall not 
question the claim that moral worth lies in acting out of duty, 
inclinations will not be viewed as defining psychological 
circumstances which are to be disregarded when acting out 
of duty. Rather, they will be seen to have a role in the 
implementation of the agent’s duty. 
A notion of self-involving characteristic desires will 
perhaps strike one at the outset as un-Kantian. This paper 
will not suggest that such a notion is put forward by Kant. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Additionally, as we shall see, the covert contentious exclusion of all but 
mere rationality as definitive of our selves is closely connected with the 
controversial issue of the lack of moral value of benevolent action. 
6 This covert claim may, prima facie, seem to be related to the contentious 
claim in GMM III, that we can consider ourselves to be members of the 
intelligible world, i.e. as transcendentally free, on the basis of our being 
endowed with reason. That such an inference is not valid, is generally agreed 
among commentators (e.g. Allison, 1990:227-9). But the covert claim in 
GMM I is distinct in that no grounding is at stake here. Rather, 
transcendental freedom is, in effect, assumed (at least as a practical 
assumption). But in so doing, any other characteristic features of a practical 
self are excluded: free rationality is taken to be the sole determinant of our 
nature as agents. 
7 There are, no doubt, some desires that are more important to our sense of 
self than others. This would suggest a distinction between essential and non-
essential desires. I think that Williams’s view that “categorical desires” can 
be taken as definitive of a notion of self is problematic because of how the 
objects of inclinations change over time. This issue is in any case not relevant 
to the discussion in this paper however (although see footnote 11), so I shall 
rather view the self as defined by all desires characterising an individual’s 
agency. 
T 
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But in the absence of any unambiguous statement as to what 
characterises the selfhood of the agent in Kant’s practical 
philosophy,8 this is proposed as an interpretation that is in 
the spirit of Kant’s project, and which will help clarify issues 
of moral worth. 
To respond to the claim that this notion of self is un-
Kantian, I want to make two points. First, if the proposed 
understanding of my selfhood is to be compatible with 
GMM III, it must allow for a place for our nature as rational 
beings, and a central one, in the sense that it is “higher” 
(GMM: 452). This requirement can only be accommodated 
if (i) the desires characterising my self do not exhaust my 
selfhood, but that it is also that of a rational being; and if (ii) 
my rational choices can impact which desires are indeed 
thus characteristic of my self. That is, although I have 
characteristic inclinations and cannot be a human self with-
out them, I must be free to alter these inclinations.9 This will 
no doubt not sound congenial to a defender of the Hegel-
Williams line, but it would, arguably be in line with 
Schiller’s attempt to reconcile a notion of ‘beautiful soul’ 
(Schiller, 1867: 275-6) with the requirements of duty. 
Although there is no space to argue this point here, I would 
pre-empt criticisms from the Hegel-Williams corner by 
pointing to Kant’s understanding of freedom, which is an 
incompatibilist one. With the practical assumption of 
transcendental freedom, any claim that inclinations cannot 
be altered can be rejected. Ultimately, the choice of incentive 
is up to the agent on this incompatibilist account. This is best 
expressed in terms of what Allison (1990: 40) refers to as the 
Incorporation Thesis according to which the agent acts upon 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 There is, of course, the notion of Gesinnung (AA06:25), but this reflects 
rather one’s fundamental disposition, as opposed to constituting a bona fide 
notion of practical self. 
9 The “alteration of inclinations” here means: (i) bringing them under control 
(as Kant advocates for all inclinations MM:408), thus altering their strength 
or range, but also (ii) cultivating other, possibly new, inclinations (as we shall 
see later), which may counterbalance existing ones. 
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a freely chosen incentive that is incorporated into the 
maxim/principle of action.10 
If this first response is largely a denial that my proposal is 
un-Kantian, the second claims that it is consistent with 
Kant’s metaphysics. As explained above, the inclusion of 
inclinations among psychological circumstances amounts to 
viewing them as objects in inner sense. But, as we saw, 
inclinations are triggered by agreeable sensations (CJ:207), 
but sensations referred to the subject, not the object 
(CJ:206). Since, in so doing, sensation ‘is not used for 
cognition at all’ (ibid.), it is hard to see how inclinations 
which result from them should amount to objective deter-
minations of an object, namely the psychological circum-
stances of the action. 
My third response is a claim that the proposal is actually 
Kantian, and can be understood as congenial to, or even im-
plied by, Kant’s picture of agency in its intelligible/empirical 
duality. The empirical character is the law of the empirical 
causality of a human agent (A549-B577). That is, on the 
deterministic picture characterising the world of appearances 
(the empirical world) the agent acts on subjective maxims 
(A549-50/B577-78). This empirical character is presented 
by Kant as the appearance of, or as grounded in, the 
intelligible character. Since only phenomena can be known, 
it is plausible to present the empirical character, qua chosen 
at the intelligible level, as defining the agent’s self from the 
practical point of view. 
This empirical character is generally interpreted prac-
tically in terms of a belief-desire model whereby, given the 
knowledge available to the agent, a certain desire drives her 
agency. This practical interpretation is plausible: to say that 
an agent acts through subjective maxims, is to say that she 
desires to achieve certain ends in the light of her beliefs 
about her circumstances. This notion of desire expresses 
what Kant calls inclination, and it amounts to a practical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Sartre’s powerful analysis of bad faith (from an equally incompatibilist 
notion of freedom) would apply to claims about the unalterability of 
inclinations. 
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interpretation of the causal factors involved in the empirical 
account of agency. Insofar as this is a practical interpretation, 
these inclinations do not determine any object in inner sense, 
in line with the second point above. This also provides no 
knowledge of the theoretical subject, in line with Kant’s 
statement in CJ (206). Rather these inclinations characterise 
the agent in the empirical world from the practical point of 
view, in the same way as Kant will show that transcendental 
freedom characterises the agent in the intelligible world 
from the intelligible point of view (CPrR: 49). This gives us 
a good Kantian basis for characterising an individual in 
terms of “inclinations” typifying her empirical character, and 
viewed as ultimately chosen by her insofar as she has an 
intelligible nature.11 At the end of this paper, I shall show 
that the introduction of such a notion of practical self is 
helpful in making sense of some of Kant’s pronouncements 
in the MM. 
 
 
B. 
Moral Worth and Subordinate Inclinations 
 
A role for inclinations in the implementation of duty 
 
ith this broader practical notion of self, when 
assessing the moral worth of agency, a lack of 
dependence upon favourable circumstances of 
inner sense need therefore not imply that no inclinations are 
operative in the action. What exactly this role could be, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 These inclinations have a more or less strong grip on the agent. This 
practical notion of self does not, therefore, define a substantial notion of self 
with precise boundaries. This explains why Kant does not introduce any 
notion of phenomenal self as substance in the realm of appearances. It is 
rather in terms of its causal role in the world of appearances that I am 
characterising the self, in line with Kant’s introduction of the notion of 
empirical character. Like the empirical character, it will evolve over time. 
The comments of an anonymous referee on this issue are gratefully 
acknowledged. 
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how inclinations could, as a result, have a part to play in 
morally worthy action needs to be clarified. 
Importantly, any potential role of inclinations has to agree 
with the unambiguous statements we find in Kant’s text. In 
GMM:397-8, Kant considers two cases of action out of 
inclination in such a way that the action coincides with the 
requirements of duty: the honest shopkeeper seeks this 
coincidence because it is good business; the sympathetically 
constituted agent wants to spread joy, and this happens to 
coincide with his duty. Kant contrasts these with an agent 
who does not commit suicide against his inclinations out of 
duty, and one who helps others against his inclinations out of 
duty. The latter are the only cases in which the action has 
moral worth. That is because, in the first two cases, the 
action is out of inclination and only contingently coincides 
with duty. 
It would seem that Kant leaves no room for any contri-
bution of inclinations to dutiful action and that is the stan-
dard interpretation, but a case which he has not examined, is 
that of an agent whose inclinations comply with duty, and 
whose action on these inclinations is controlled by duty. 
This would mean that duty would have the role of sanction-
ing the inclination driven action. I shall refer to this as the 
case of a dutiful benevolent agent.12 
This type of example has been discussed in the Kantian 
literature, e.g. recently by Kerstein (2002:118-9;132-8). It is 
taken as a case in which it would be ‘odd (…) to act from 
duty, rather than from inclination’ (Kerstein, 2002:118-9). It 
is noteworthy however, that intuitions diverge among 
Kantian scholars on this point, as Timmermann’s (2009:53) 
opinion indicates: ‘Why would someone choose to be 
motivated by inclination because it happens to coincide with 
morality? Why not simply act on moral grounds right 
away?’.13 Setting aside for now the differences in their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 I am using ‘dutiful’ here to characterise the agent whose action is 
sanctioned by duty. 
13 Timmermann’s question follows from the assumption that the motive of 
duty is “present” here, since its “absence” would exclude moral worth.  
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interpretations of the motivational situation, what is common 
to both interpreters’ understanding of it, is that duty features 
as ‘backup motive’ (Timmermann, 2009: 51), as Henson 
(1979) proposes. That is, it would be operative in doing the 
right thing, or preventing the agent from doing the wrong 
thing, were the inclination not coincident with duty. The 
implication is that, otherwise, it is not the motive here.14 
Nevertheless, it seems that inclinations somehow do the 
work of duty here, and therefore arguably contribute to 
moral worth. This leads some (Kerstein, 2002: 38) to reject 
Kant’s claim that it is necessary that an action be done from 
duty to have moral worth. It is therefore crucial to find a 
satisfactory way of elucidating this type of example, if 
Kant’s claim of necessity is to be upheld. The interpretation I 
propose allows for a contribution of inclinations to morally 
worthy action, while upholding Kant’s claim. 
 
o understand the role of inclinations, we should draw the 
consequences from the above claim about the fact that the 
agent is characterised by her freely chosen empirical 
character. This involves a number of inclinations which she 
is more or less attached to (they are more or less central to 
who she is). These are the desires of the empirical account of 
agency, and so tell us nought about the motive the agent has 
chosen, i.e. about the intelligible account of her action. This 
might be thought to be an argument for ignoring the em-
pirical account of action in ethics. And, indeed, discussion 
by Kantian scholars of Kant’s ethics generally focuses 
exclusively upon the incentives which the agent acts upon 
insofar as he takes himself to be free.15 As we have seen 
above, however, when it comes to making sense of whether 
inclinations are involved in action, we cannot ignore the fact 
that the self, from a practical point of view, is characterised 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Timmermann rightly rejects the proposed back-up role of duty as defining 
a morally worthy action, but this paper proposes a revised version of this role 
which has duty as the motive, and therefore is morally worthy. 
15 This is true even for compatibilist accounts, although, here, the freedom 
shifts to that of the agent to determine his choices rationally, rather than a 
freedom of doing otherwise for particular actions (e.g. Rauscher, 2009).  
T 
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by inclinations. This provides us with another way of look-
ing at inclinations’ role which goes beyond the dichotomy of 
Inclination16 and duty as the two motives a free agent can act 
upon. The claim in this paper is that this way of looking at 
inclinations in practical terms as causal factors in the 
empirical account of action captures some of what is at stake 
in the criticisms addressed to Kant’s rigorism and which 
come to the fore in the case of the dutiful benevolent agent. 
Moreover, there is a methodological reason for thinking that 
this way of looking at inclinations is relevant against such 
criticisms: typically, these criticisms do not refer to the 
picture of transcendentally free agency that lies at the heart 
of Kant’s practical philosophy. Indeed, Humean critiques 
would not endorse the necessity of referring to such a 
picture. Kant’s account can provide answers to these criti-
cisms only insofar as Kant’s account of agency attends to 
how an action is implemented in the world of appearances. 
And the empirical character with its characteristic 
inclinations is at the core of the empirical account this 
amounts to. 
 
o help focus intuitions, consider my being moved to 
provide a beggar with food. The inclination to do this will 
present itself to me. I claim that I will act morally if I act on 
this inclination insofar as I have endorsed it as a form of 
action that is dutiful, and would not act upon it were it not 
compatible with the requirements of duty.17 That is, to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 I shall capitalise the word when referring to the incentive that is taken up 
by the agent as sufficient for action, insofar as this agent views himself as 
transcendentally free. 
17 The time at which this endorsement takes place is not relevant to the moral 
value of the action. However, from what I said above, one might be tempted 
to conclude that this endorsement happened prior to the particular instance 
discussed in the example. However, inclinations are notoriously ill-defined, 
and to assume one has, once and for all, given an inclination the green light, 
as it were, is to assume that one knows, in all contexts, how this inclination 
will manifest itself (and to overlook the reality of the interaction of 
inclinations). The endorsement (or non-endorsement and correction) of the 
inclination is rather an on-going process, which translates the fact that the 
causal impact of the intelligible on the empirical character is not located in 
time. 
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answer the question I put at the beginning of this section, this 
role of the motive of duty will ensure the required lack of 
dependence upon favourable inclinations that is required by 
Kant’s notion of unconditional good.  
Another way of looking at this, is to say that the moral 
worth of the act springs from the endorsement of the 
inclination since it involves my taking this inclination as 
defining a way of acting aimed at satisfying it, a way of 
acting that I can simultaneously will to be universal law: 
referring to GMM II, I can indeed simultaneously will that 
all agents act on benevolent inclinations that accord with the 
requirements of duty. I will not be doing anything morally 
worthy, however, if I simply act on this inclination, without 
any regard for duty (GMM: 398). I would then be acting 
merely out of Inclination, i.e. Inclination would be the 
motive incorporated into my maxim/principle of action. 
However, inclinations, insofar as they are kept in check by 
duty, are properly described as subordinate inclinations. 
They are not, in themselves, morally worthy. But acting on 
them is morally worthy insofar as they are guided and 
controlled by duty. I shall refer to this as the case of the 
dutiful benevolent agent. 
 
 see this role of inclinations as continuous with that which 
commentators do agree upon (see Timmermann, 2009:60), 
namely the part which they play in specifying the detail of 
any action out of duty. Let us suppose that, although I am 
otherwise inclined, I decide to help a beggar by providing 
food. A number of inclinations present themselves which 
will ensure the type of food, its quantity, its presentation, are 
specified. As long as these do not conflict with duty, they are 
endorsed. 
From what was explained above, I claim that these moti-
vations are the desires involved in a practical understanding 
of the empirical account of action. This seems a plausible 
account. The alternative would be the claim that these are to 
be viewed as Inclinations that are taken as sufficient for 
action on the intelligible account of action. But this would 
I
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not reflect their subordinate status, i.e. their being part of the 
implementation of the requirements of duty in the world of 
appearances.18 Indeed, the fact that we are looking at an 
implementation of duty requires that such inclinations not be 
taken to be sufficient grounds of action: only duty must be 
such a ground. They are but the empirical desires imple-
menting the requirements of duty. Accounting for the role of 
these inclinations as desires involved in the empirical 
account of the action, i.e. characteristics of his self, avoids 
such worries, and is intuitively more plausible.  
I am suggesting the same interpretation applies to the case 
of the benevolent inclination towards the beggar, with duty 
as motive playing a “supervisory” role, that of endorsing or 
not the inclinations that prompt action, and the whole of the 
action involving subordinate inclinations. 
 
Subordinate inclinations and motivation 
 
here is however an immediate worry here, namely 
that there is a clear difference between the dutiful 
benevolent agent, and the role of inclinations in 
specifying the detail of an action. In the case of the dutiful 
benevolent agent, the inclination to help the beggar is the 
starting point for the action of helping him. In the case of 
specifying the detail of the help to be provided out of duty, 
the subordinate inclinations are arguably involved at a later 
stage in the action. This seems to reflect a difference of 
priority, with an Inclination being the real incentive or 
Triebfeder in the first case, while duty is the incentive in the 
second.19 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The subordinate role of the inclinations defining the detail of the action is 
in line with the interpretation of the principle/maxim of the action that is 
examined for its moral worth, being understood as a general principle of 
action (Kuehn, 2009; Onof, 1998), thereby avoiding standard problems of 
failure to pass the test of the CI because of the amount of detail that is 
included in the specification of the principle/maxim (e.g. see Illies, 
2007:313). 
19 This is the worry which underpins the ‘back-up’ role of duty as discussed 
by Timmermann (2009:51-53). But the case I am discussing differs from that 
T 
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Grounds for such a view are most readily found in the 
difference in temporal ordering characterising the motiva-
tional structure of the action in each case. What we might 
call the temporal profile of the dutiful benevolent agent’s 
action is marked by an appeal to one of the formulas of the 
Categorical Imperative (CI), to assess whether his action is 
permissible. This appeal manifests itself after a benevolent 
inclination has presented the provision of help as a desirable 
form of action. The temporal profile of the agent who 
experiences no such inclination but helps out of duty appears 
to be triggered by consulting the moral law, which reveals 
that the only forms of permissible action involves providing 
some kind of help.20 
This distinction between temporal profiles is, arguably, 
somewhat simplified insofar as the non-benevolent agent is 
only able to recognise what her duty is, if she is sensitive to 
the need for help that is on display. It seems theoretically 
possible for the moral salience of the situation (Herman, 
1993:77-8) to be perceived without any inclination to 
provide help, although in most cases, I suspect that some 
(possibly very weak) inclination is experienced (Herman, 
1993:25).21 Whatever the case may be, the important differ-
ence with the other case is that, for the non-benevolently 
inclined agent, any such inclination is insufficiently strong or 
overriding of contrary inclinations to move the agent to 
provide help. So the situation of this non-benevolent agent is 
one in which an inclination contrary to duty (e.g. laziness) 
prevails when the appeal to the CI is made which reveals 
that this is not permissible.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in which duty is a mere back-up incentive. Rather, I am arguing that duty is 
the real motive here. 
20 There is no space here to contribute to the debate around whether a broad 
duty such as that of beneficence calls for action in all instances in which an 
agent encounters someone in need, and I am assuming that the requirement of 
duty is such that, in this case, help is called for by the moral law. 
21 I think it is possible to say that this is the case, even when the agent has 
sadistic tendencies. Moreover, it would seem, on the grounds of efficiency 
which will be discussed below, that we have a duty to ‘sympathise actively 
in’ the fate of those who are in need of help (MM:457). 
KSO 2011: 
 
 
Christian Onof,  
Moral Worth and Inclinations in Kantian Ethics, 
KSO 2011: 116-161. 
Posted April 7, 2011 www.kantstudiesonline.net 
© 2011 Christian Onof & Kant Studies Online Ltd. 	  
131 
The difference with the dutiful benevolent agent now 
therefore seems to be one of distinct inclinations. The non-
benevolent agent’s immoral inclination not to help is 
blocked by the moral law which then has to define a 
permissible course of action. The benevolent agent’s moral 
inclination passes the test of the CI, so he proceeds to 
provide the help he is inclined to give. When the different 
situations are represented in this way, to assign moral worth 
to the first and not the second agent’s action would seem to 
make the assignment of moral worth dependent upon what 
kind of inclinations are present. Since this is obviously 
contrary to the definition of the unconditional good, the 
temporal profiles provide no grounds for discriminating 
between the goodness of these two actions: both represent an 
implementation of duty. 
The fact that it is anyway misleading to draw conclusions 
from the temporal motivational profiles of both actions, can 
be seen by recalling Kant’s distinction in the CPR between 
the Quid juris? and the Quid facti? Questions (A84/B116). 
These questions arise in relation to synthetic a priori 
judgements. In practical philosophy, the issue of whether the 
judgement that an action is good, raises an issue of 
justification, i.e. a Quid juris? question. The answer to that 
question cannot involve appealing to the genesis of the 
action. What makes such an appeal tempting in the practical 
case is the notion that the inclination which proposes the 
action represents the key incentive, as the word Triebfeder 
suggests. But the notion of Triebfeder does not, in fact, refer 
to time. If I build a dam across a river to generate electricity, 
it is not the water flowing downstream that is the trigger of 
this production. It is my releasing/channelling the stored 
water onto my turbine which is the trigger. I have full 
control over the water stored behind the sluice gate. And I 
use it for my own purposes: I can stop it from flowing 
further, or I can channel it through the sluice gate to produce 
electricity. In the same way, the dutiful benevolent agent’s 
appeal to the moral law to check his action, has total control 
over the subsequent developments. Should this appeal reveal 
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his action is immoral, he would not go ahead with it. This 
would be the case, were his action to infringe the moral law. 
Thus, duty’s endorsement or rejection of the action 
prompted by an inclination, defines it as an action that has its 
incentive in duty, although the content of the action is the 
object of the agent’s inclination. And the inclinations which 
define the course of the action are therefore subordinate 
inclinations. If the action defined by these inclinations is 
endorsed as what is required by duty, it ought to go ahead.  
These subordinate inclinations therefore implement the 
commands of duty in the empirical account of agency. They 
provide an answer to the question which Guevara (2000) 
asks, namely: what inclinations are involved in the empirical 
account of action out of duty? Typically, this question 
receives the answer that it is respect for the moral law that is 
the relevant term filling in the empirical account of action 
out of duty (e.g. Rauscher, 2009:209fn; GMM:460). Aside 
from the fact that this respect is thereby treated as an 
inclination, although Kant expressly indicates that it is not an 
inclination, this answer does not account for the obvious 
diversity of actions out of duty in terms of their empirical 
content. This is not to say that respect does not play a role. 
On the contrary, since it represents the affective dimension 
of moral motivation, it is respect for the moral law which 
mobilises inclinations in the service of duty when the agent 
has to act against prevailing inclinations. That means: either 
mustering pre-existing (but currently dormant) inclinations; 
or triggering action, and thereby planting the seeds for new 
inclinations, through habituation. It is in this sense that incli-
nations contribute to morally worthy action: as the desires of 
a belief-desire model of the empirical account of moral 
action. 
The conclusion reached so far is that the dutiful 
benevolent agent is no different from a dutiful agent in terms 
of the moral worth of his action. The diverging intuitions 
displayed by Kerstein (2002:118-9) and Timmermann 
(2009:52-3) to the question of whether duty requires one to 
act ‘out of duty’ when duty and inclinations converge are 
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accommodated by the present proposal. The action must 
indeed be ‘out of duty’ as Timmermann rightly claims, but it 
can involve inclinations, as Kerstein correctly points out. 
The claim is that the action is wrongly described as being 
out of inclination once it is clear that duty is endorsing it as a 
way of implementing what duty requires. A reformulation of 
the question might now compare (a) letting the original act 
prompted by the inclination go ahead, i.e. to let the 
inclination pursue its course because it is dutiful, so that it is 
therefore under the control of the motive of duty; and (b) to 
ask for duty to redefine a new action. And the answer has to 
be that there are no grounds in duty for demanding 
something like (b) since duty has endorsed the action 
proposed by the inclination described in (a). 
 
 
C. 
Moral Worth of the Action and the Agent 
 
The agent’s moral worth 
 
he interpretation proposed here does not assign more 
moral worth to the action of the dutiful agent who 
has no inclinations to act dutifully, than to the dutiful 
benevolent agent. It is of course well known that Kant pours 
praise upon the agent who acts out of duty when he is not so 
inclined (GMM:398). This is what triggers Schiller’s ironic 
remark known as Schiller’s joke (Paton,1958:48). Why does 
Kant do this, and how does the proposed interpretation make 
sense of this? A standard reply to the first question consists 
in emphasising that in this agent’s action, duty is isolated 
from any other possible motivating factors. The claim would 
therefore be that it appears all the more clearly, like a star 
would in the night sky. 
Although this is congenial to the interpretation I have 
proposed so far, and, I think, correct, I want to suggest that 
there is more to be said here. There is something else that 
T 
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Kant is drawing our attention to, which appears all the more 
clearly in this agent. Recall that Kant later claims that duty 
commands us to develop inclinations which are conducive 
to our doing our duty (MM:457). Namely, he is aware of the 
obstacles that are to be overcome in doing one’s duty 
without the support of pre-existing active inclinations.22 On 
the present interpretation, duty will have the task of mobi-
lising one or more “dormant” inclinations,23 or giving rise to 
new ones. Thus action out of duty without pre-existing 
supporting inclinations involves duty ‘doing more’.24 This is 
the role of the feeling of respect: it enables duty to trigger 
action. To use the analogy of the hydro-electric generation 
of electrical power, here, water is not already flowing and 
available to be channelled for the right purposes. Water has 
to be brought to the turbines, pumped there. 
What does this mean in terms of moral worth? Kant 
himself gives us a clue here, by talking, aside from the moral 
worth of the dutiful non-benevolent agent’s action, about his 
moral worth as an agent: ‘would not he find in himself a 
source from which to give himself a far higher worth than he 
would have got by having a good-natured temperament?’ 
(GMM: 398). That is, the issue at stake is indeed that moral 
worth shines all the brighter because of the absence of pre-
existing inclinations, but it is in particular the agent’s moral 
worth that one is thereby made aware of. Let us see how this 
distinction between the action’s and the agent’s worth can be 
motivated. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Inclinations could exist but not be active. An extreme case of this would be 
the lack of drive characterising the depressed agent. 
23 See footnote 22. 
24 A dormant inclination can be “awoken” and made use of. I may thus help 
the beggar by viewing this action as similar to that of helping my ailing 
uncle, and thereby use this inclination which was otherwise dormant, out of 
respect for the moral law. More generally, the “channelling” of one’s 
energies is a way of mustering inclinations for a certain purpose (Rosenblatt 
and Thickstun, 1970). As for the notion of giving rise to inclinations, it is 
respect which steers the development of my action; in so doing, it creates a 
new inclination (however weak). This is a purely empirical claim, but we will 
see that it involves a characterisation of the way in which intelligible choices 
are manifested in the realm of appearances. 
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The moral worth of the agent can be understood as the 
moral worth of this agent’s possible actions. In other words, 
this notion addresses the much discussed issue of the agent’s 
moral fitness (Henson, 1979). Henson points out that Kant is 
often interpreted as working with a ‘battle citation’ model of 
the moral worth of an action, in which such moral worth 
accrues only to actions done out of duty against inclination, 
or at least, without any inclination coinciding with duty. This 
is, for instance, the view taken by Schiller in his joke (Paton, 
1958:48). To this implausible interpretation, he opposes a 
‘fitness report’ understanding of moral worth. This takes the 
action of a dutiful benevolent agent to be morally worthy as 
long as it would have been done out of duty, had duty alone 
been available as a motive. This is the ‘back-up’ role of duty 
discussed above. Henson is in effect assuming 
overdetermination here (with inclination and duty as the two 
motives) and introducing modal considerations to assess the 
fitness of the motive of duty. This modal move is, as I have 
suggested, the right way to understand Kant’s praise for the 
agent acting out of duty against her inclinations. 
But the description of this as a case of overdetermination 
is untenable. Kant’s understanding of motivation in Religion 
within the Boundaries of Pure Reason (AA06:24) clearly 
states that a single incentive is taken as sufficient for any 
particular action. This is a key feature of Allison’s (1990:40) 
Incorporation Thesis presented earlier in the paper. There 
cannot therefore be any real overdetermination, unless this 
amounts to conflating the two levels of description of 
agency, so that the incentives operating in the belief-desire 
description of action, and duty as incentive freely chosen by 
the agent, are viewed as providing an overdetermination of 
action. But that would be to misunderstand the results of the 
Third Antinomy which keeps these levels apart as empirical 
and intelligible descriptions respectively. 
Herman (1993: 7-13) points out another key problem 
with Henson’s ‘fitness report’ model, namely that it can 
exist in a weak or strong form. The weak form has it that if 
duty had been the only motive, i.e. if the agent had 
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experienced no feeling of benevolence, the agent would 
have acted dutifully. Herman points out that this is too weak, 
as it does not tell us what the agent would have done had her 
inclination become antagonistic to duty. But then a strong 
interpretation would seem to require moral heroism, i.e. that 
one would have done the right thing, however strong one’s 
aversion to the action. 
Herman’s conclusion that, since neither weak nor strong 
interpretations of the ‘fitness model’ will do, such modal 
considerations are out of place, would seem to follow. 
However, this view has rightly been criticised (Sorrell, 1978; 
Allison, 1990:115-116) as failing to meet the second 
requirement for morally good actions, as set out at the start 
of the paper, namely that its moral worth not be accidental. 
And indeed, such modal considerations would seem called 
for to provide a satisfactory interpretation of Kant’s praise 
for action out of duty with no supporting inclinations. 
Allison’s (1990:116-118) solution to this dilemma 
involves shifting the debate to focus upon the incentive 
which is ‘taken up’ into the maxim/principle of action. This 
is a single one: it cannot be a disjunction of incentives. It 
alone determines the moral worth of the action. Although 
this is correct, this does not directly address the way in 
which modal considerations are relevant. Additionally, the 
interpretation proposed in this paper has stressed the 
importance of viewing particular actions as involving incli-
nations in their empirical descriptions. In considering actions 
with different inclinations, it is different actions which are 
considered: it is no longer the moral worth of the particular 
action that is at stake. 
I think one can therefore do justice to Herman’s (1993: 
11) rejecting the idea that the moral worth of an action 
should involve considering other possible inclinations (or 
their absence), while accepting that such possibilities are 
relevant to assessing moral worth in some sense. As 
indicated above, this involves describing the moral worth in 
question as that of a set of possible actions. Insofar as action 
from duty gives rise to new inclinations or strengthens 
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existing ones (through habituation) which act as subordinate 
inclinations under the control of the motive of duty, and that 
such subordinate inclinations characterise the agent’s self in 
a practical sense, we can now see in what sense this moral 
worth is the agent’s moral worth. Those inclinations which 
are acquired through dutiful action, are thus the mark of the 
agent’s moral worth in the temporal order. 
So, the unconditional good of the good will is therefore 
not simply apportioned to moral actions, but also to the 
moral agent. This distinction is called for on the present 
interpretation as there are two different levels of moral worth 
that emerge: on the one hand, with whatever pre-existing 
inclinations the agent happens to have, certain acts will be 
performed out of duty. These are, for instance, the acts of the 
dutiful benevolent agent. But the modal issues arising in the 
discussion of the fitness report model pertain to the assess-
ment of the moral worth of the agent. Insofar as the agent 
has developed such benevolent inclinations, he has demon-
strated the fitness of his motive of duty. 
In the first part of the paper, it has been argued that 
inclinations contribute to morally worthy action. Now,25 we 
see how the acquisition of new inclinations and the growth 
of existing ones is a manifestation in the world of appear-
ances of the agent’s moral worth.26 While the moral worth 
of an action is manifested at a particular point in time, the 
agent’s moral worth appears over the agent’s lifetime. Since 
this moral worth is characterised by developments in my in-
clinations, it is thus reasonable to view these as defining a 
notion of moral progress which is the appearance in time of 
the agent’s moral worth. Another way of putting this is to 
view the agent’s moral worth as that of his intelligible 
character, which is reflected in the determination over time 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for making me rethink the issues 
in this paragraph.  
26 This does not imply that one can infer anything about the agent’s moral 
worth from these empirical manifestations since sympathetic inclinations 
could be acquired for non-moral purposes (e.g. as in the case of a pleasantly 
disposed shop-keeper whose motivations are similar to those of Kant’s honest 
shopkeeper, GMM:397). 
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of an empirical character with its characteristic inclina-
tions.27 
 
his interpretation goes beyond the letter of much of Kant’s 
text, but there are textual indications that it is at least 
congenial to Kant’s views. First, the notion of an agent’s 
moral worth can be understood as corresponding to the 
agent’s Gesinnung. This is ‘the ultimate subjective ground 
of the adoption of maxims’ (AA06: 25). As such, it is this 
ground that determines the fitness of the agent’s incentive of 
duty, i.e. indicates how the agent will act in possible 
circumstances.28 Second, the indirect duty to develop our 
compassionate inclinations (MM:457) can be interpreted as 
reflecting a duty to develop morally, thus echoing the 
proposed notion of moral progress. Such positive moral 
progress is the temporal manifestation of a good Gesinnung. 
At the empirical level, this development amounts to a 
strengthening of subordinate inclinations and the develop-
ment of new ones.29 Third, the convergence of inclinations 
and duty which Schiller seeks, is also a goal for Kant.30 Thus 
Kant says that ‘a heart which is happy in the performance of 
its duty (not merely complacent in the recognition thereof) is 
a mark of genuineness in the virtuous disposition’ (AA06: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 It is not only in the case of dutiful action against existing inclinations that 
this is manifested, but also in any endorsement of existing subordinate 
inclinations which thereby strengthens them. But it is in the first case that this 
manifestation is the more evident, hence Kant’s singling out the example of 
the beneficent agent with no sympathy for mankind (GMM:398-399). 
28 It is not the purpose of this paper to analyse this notion in detail. It will 
have to suffice that I suggest that such a notion should not be viewed as a 
choice which is somehow prior to the agent’s developments, but rather as a 
choice which this very development reflects. One way of making sense of 
this is to view the appearing of this Gesinnung in the empirical world as an 
unfolding in time of this timeless notion from the intelligible point of view, 
and as a constructive process in time (notion of moral progress) from the 
empirical point of view. 
29 These developments also contribute to making our moral action more 
efficient (see footnote 54). What we now see is how these empirical features 
of the development of inclinations are a temporal manifestation of the agent’s 
moral worth. 
30 Kant would rightly insist upon a clear controlling role for duty that Schiller 
may not have accepted. 
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23-24n). This is exactly what is entailed in the proposed 
notion of moral worth of the agent. 
 
Another interpretation 
 
efore considering important concerns with the pro-
posed interpretation of duty, I shall examine another 
well-established interpretation which will provide 
useful insights into the present interpretation. The distinction 
between the two agents of my example is that which 
Herman examines when she distinguishes acting ‘from 
principle’ and ‘on a motive that gives an agent concern for 
the conformity of his action to a principle’. But Herman 
adopts another interpretation of the motivational situation. In 
the case of action which is constrained by the moral law in 
the way our benevolent agent’s action is when he consults its 
conformity to duty, Herman (1993: 14-5) and Baron (1995: 
131) distinguish between a primary motive which is not 
duty if the action is merely permissible, and a secondary one 
which is duty. These authors’ analyses, originally designed 
to give an account of the motivational structure underlying 
permissible action, were extended to obligatory action by 
Benson (1987: 397-80). As he sees it ‘knowing that an ac-
tion must be performed can authoritatively govern conduct, 
while non-moral concerns directly motivate it’ (ibid.). 
Prima facie, this claim is congenial to the proposal in this 
paper, but the motivational interpretation is different. Allison 
criticizes the claim for not properly distinguishing between 
the cases of morally permissible and obligatory action. In the 
first case, permissibility is not a sufficient reason for choos-
ing to act in the proposed way, while an action’s being 
obligatory is. This difference does not seem to be reflected 
by the mere proposal that in both cases, duty must be 
operating regulatively “in the background” as it were 
(Allison, 1990:119-120). Although Allison’s critique does 
not fully seem to take on board the fruitfulness of Benson’s 
proposal, he is right to point out that this issue of sufficiency 
is not addressed by Benson. 
B 
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Does the notion of subordinate inclinations introduced in 
this paper also fail to deal with this issue adequately? The 
proposed interpretation is that subordinate inclinations 
implement an obligatory form of action in the same way as 
they operate to define the detail of any permissible action. 
The worry may be that this does not properly reflect the 
difference between permissible and obligatory action. But 
this difference is sometimes misunderstood, in particular 
when the permissible is simply equated with the morally 
indifferent. There is no space to address this issue in detail 
here. Two points should be made to show the inter-
connectedness of the permissible and the obligatory. First, it 
is always obligatory to act in a permissible way. Second, a 
type of action is considered obligatory insofar as the range of 
permissible action contains only this type of action. But 
insofar as there are many action tokens belonging to this 
type, there is still a wealth of permissible implementations 
here. So no strong permissible/obligatory divide needs to be 
reflected in our understanding of moral motivation.31 
The important concern flagged by Allison, is that of 
whether duty is a sufficient motive when a type of action is 
morally required, and this is not clearly addressed by the 
Baron-Herman-Benson dual motivation (BHB-DM) propos-
al. It is, however, in the proposal in this paper: if the agent 
has understood that the situation gives rise to a requirement 
of duty, any inclination not to act accordingly (e.g. rather in 
pursuit of a competing end) is overridden by the incentive of 
duty controlling the agent’s actions. In terms of action type, 
if a certain type is obligatory, this is equivalent to a com-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 One might worry that moral worth accrues to permissible action on my 
interpretation (e.g. Kerstein, 2002:137). This worry is connected with cases 
of morally indifferent action. But there are few situations (arguably none?), 
in which I have no duties constraining my action. My compliance with the 
requirements of duty simply captures my attending to these constraints, and 
this is morally worthy. This may not give us much insight into the agent’s 
moral worth, but it is morally worthy as an action. The role of duty is, in fact, 
greater than may at first appear: in my aim to relax for instance (see Kerstein, 
2002:137), I shall choose ways that do not impair my ability to do my duty, 
and which even make me better able to do it, in line with Kant’s claim we 
have an indirect duty to secure our own happiness (GMM:399). 
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mand to act in ways defined by that action type.32 The 
specification of the action token may then draw upon 
subordinate inclinations. 
There are other reasons for being dissatisfied with the 
BHB-DM picture. The appeal to two motives is difficult to 
reconcile with Kant’s understanding of rational agency as 
expressed by Allison’s Incorporation Thesis. As we saw 
above, this requires that a single incentive be incorporated 
into a maxim/principle of action. 
The two concerns above are related: the fact that it is not 
clear that duty as a secondary motive would be sufficient in 
cases where inclinations and duty do not converge, suggests 
that duty must be the sole motive in the intelligible account 
of the action. Although he does not appeal to the 
empirical/intelligible distinction in his analysis, Stratton-
Lake (2000:54-57) reaches the same conclusion in his 
criticism of the BHB-DM picture. More specifically, 
Stratton-Lake asks whether an obligatory act can be done 
from a non-moral primary motive with duty as a secondary 
motive. The problem is that, for Herman, the agent’s acting 
from the secondary motive of duty is not acting from the 
motive of duty. It would therefore seem that doing the 
obligatory act out of duty can only happen if duty is the 
primary motive. 
As Stratton-Lake notes (2000:56), Baron’s understanding 
of the motivational picture is somewhat different in that, 
here, the secondary motive does not merely have a 
regulative role, but also expresses the agent’s commitment to 
morality. Stratton-Lake (ibid.) argues that this is still not 
sufficient to deal with the problem, as the reason for acting 
in the required obligatory way must be ‘the reason why the 
act ought to be done’. But this is just to say that the primary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Any worries that not acting in certain ways is not equivalent to acting in 
different ways should be dispelled as inaction is here understood as a form of 
action (e.g. motivated by laziness). This is consistent with Kant’s 
understanding of our transcendental freedom: one cannot abstain from 
choosing, a point which Sartre later rightly emphasised. 
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motive has to be the ‘lawlike nature of the agent’s maxim’, 
and cannot be any inclination.33 
The proposal in this paper has it that action from duty is 
characterized by having the incentive of duty in a controlling 
role: it is not merely regulative, as Herman’s secondary mo-
tive is, and it does not only reflect a commitment to moral-
ity, as Baron’s secondary motive does. It is the only incen-
tive relevant to assessing the moral worth of the action. The 
presence of inclinations in the empirical description of the 
action shows how they contribute to morally worthy action, 
and reflect the agent’s moral worth. The fact that action may 
be prompted by an inclination is not morally relevant, and 
should not be interpreted in terms of making this inclination 
into a (primary) motive of the action. Rather, the valid 
intuitions behind the BHB-DM proposals are here integrated 
within a consideration of the dual empirical/intelligible 
account of action which underpins Kant’s practical 
philosophy. 
 
 
D. 
The Ground of Normativity 
 
Focusing upon a standard objection 
 
he proposed interpretation does, however, encounter 
a problem: it appears not to pay due attention to an 
apparent important difference between the two 
agents in our example. This is a difference in focus between 
an agent who has a real attachment to the other’s welfare, 
while the other agent treats his action “merely” as the 
fulfilling of an obligation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 That is, the justification is the lawlike nature of the maxim on the 
‘justificatory conception of the categorical imperative’ which underpins the 
standard interpretation (and in particular Herman and Baron’s views). But 
Stratton-Lake wants to question this interpretation, and as we shall see further 
in the paper, as a result he develops a novel dual motivation picture. 
T 
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The difference is clearly expressed by Timmermann 
(2009:53): namely, when acting from duty, it is the action, 
i.e. its content, that is the focus of interest; whereas, action 
from Inclination is focused upon the outcome. On 
Timmermann’s interpretation, this is ammunition against 
viewing the dutiful benevolent agent as acting out of duty. 
On the present interpretation, it should be clear that paying 
attention to what morality commands involves the action 
being viewed as implementing the agent’s duty. So, the 
dutiful benevolent agent is, from that point of view, 
equivalent to the agent with no benevolent inclinations 
acting out of duty.  
 
ut if that were the whole story, action out of duty would 
risk falling foul of the well-known criticism which Williams 
(1981:18) addresses to Kantian ethics with his ‘one thought 
too many’ objection. This criticism, applied to our case, 
amounts to querying the meaning of the agent’s consulting 
the moral law when he is acting on an inclination (which 
coincides with it). For Williams, this amounts to his having 
the “additional thought” that it is an issue he cares about 
(and, indeed, which has paramount importance) whether his 
inclination can be endorsed by morality or not. The criticism 
is that this man’s action is motivated by the wrong reasons, 
namely that his action be dutiful, whereas what is important 
is the manifest neediness of the agent requiring help. This 
criticism is directly related to the broader issue discussed 
above, namely the Williams/Hegel claim that Kantian ethics 
alienates us from our true selves. Indeed, the view that 
Kant’s ethics of duty require us to override any inclinations 
or emotions we may experience, means that emotions and 
inclinations have no moral worth. This leads to the claim 
that Kant’s ethics alienate us from any emotions that 
represent what we value. 
This matter has been discussed extensively in the 
literature (e.g. Allison, 1990:194-198; Baron, 1995:136-140; 
Herman, 1993:24-29; Baron, 2008), and there is no space to 
analyse in detail how the proposed approach relates to these 
B 
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views. In brief, a first response which addresses Williams’s 
critique head on, is Herman’s claim (1993:25) that it is 
crucial to be able to distinguish the end from the motive of 
the action. Although these may be identical, they can also 
come apart. This is what happens in the case of our non-
benevolent agent acting out of duty: although he is 
motivated by duty, the end of his action is the provision of 
help. This seems to be a correct response to the Williams 
line of criticism. In terms of the present proposal, it takes on 
the following form. The incentive for the action is that which 
I, as transcendentally free agent, incorporate into my 
principle of action. The empirical account has it that one or 
more motivating factors determine my action. These are 
desires to achieve ends in the light of my beliefs about the 
nature of the empirical circumstances. The ends of my 
action are therefore at the heart of the empirical account of 
the action since they are definitive of the desires determining 
it. As Herman puts it ‘the motive of duty functions at least as 
well as the emotion-based motive in maintaining the agent’s 
attachment to the goal of saving someone through 
unsuccessful attempts’ (1993:29). 
However, Herman recognises that this still leaves some of 
Williams’s concerns untouched. That is, ‘what seems 
lacking [in the agent who acts out of duty] is the appropriate 
attitude and reason for action’ (Herman, 1993:30). In other 
words, the motive of duty does not seem to be what is 
“appropriate” given the situation. One could, of course, 
reject such concerns as irrelevant, and point to Williams’s 
distinct conception of morality. But, insofar as one addresses 
Williams’s view of Kant’s moral theory as alienating to the 
self, as a legitimate concern for a Kantian, one cannot 
simply dismiss Williams’s related criticism of the notion of 
acting out of duty. And indeed, Herman responds to 
Williams’s criticism by introducing the distinction between 
primary and secondary motives discussed above. We have 
seen that this distinction is problematic, and in particular 
noted its apparent incompatibility with the Incorporation 
Thesis, as well as Stratton-Lake’s related criticism of it. 
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Addressing a broader worry 
 
efore examining how the present proposal deals 
with this question, it is useful to examine how 
Stratton-Lake, following T.C. Williams’s lead 
(1968),34 alters the BHB-DM picture to address what is in 
fact a broader question than Williams’s. Insofar as Stratton-
Lake’s proposal is itself a new dual motivation picture, one 
might be tempted prima facie to reject it because of the 
Incorporation Thesis, as above. However, he states clearly 
(Stratton-Lake, 2000:63) that ‘there is an important sense in 
which one can act solely from duty on my account’. 
What is particularly interesting for our purposes here is 
that Stratton-Lake seeks to understand action out of duty 
while rejecting the standard interpretative picture according 
to which the fact that I ought to do something is a reason for 
doing it. Insofar as he does not accept that the moral 
bindingness of a type of action is a proper reason for doing 
it, he is expressing a concern of which Williams’s is a more 
specific form. While Williams worries that the reasons 
relating to emotions are not the reasons for action out of 
duty, Stratton-Lake more generally worries that the wrong 
reasons are adduced in the standard account of action out of 
duty, namely the reason that an action ought to be done 
because it is called for by the moral law. But while Williams 
takes this as a critique of Kant’s ethics, Stratton-Lake 
staunchly defends Kant’s claim that only acting out of duty 
has moral worth. 
Stratton-Lake’s solution is to adopt a version of the dual 
motivation picture. On the Stratton-Lake dual motivation 
(SL-DM) picture, an agent acting out of duty acts from ‘an 
unconditional commitment to morality as a secondary 
motive’ (as in Baron’s proposal), and is ‘motivated at the 
primary level to do what one should by nothing other than 
the reasons why the act is morally required’ (Stratton-Lake, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to this 
book. 
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2000:63). The dual motivation picture is in fact a device to 
encapsulate two different kinds of reasons for acting: norma-
tive and motivational reasons.35 The first provide the justi-
fication for the action, while the second are psychological 
states (beliefs, desires) for Stratton-Lake (2000:21). 
Although these are clearly distinct, the connection between 
rationality and morality must be maintained as it is essential 
to Kant’s project (Stratton-Lake, 2000:27). This, Stratton-
Lake achieves by having what he refers to as ‘the ground of 
duty’ (Stratton-Lake, 2000:63), i.e. what motivates the 
agent, act as normative reason for the dutiful agent. 
This is not the place to carry out an analysis of the merits 
of this very interesting proposal which has already been 
much discussed. I shall just point to the fact that it requires 
abandoning the standard interpretative conception of the 
moral law as the ground of duty, since the fact that the action 
is obligatory cannot be the reason to do it. In its place, the 
SL-DM picture puts the specific reasons giving rise to a 
duty, e.g. the neediness of the agent requiring help in our 
example. The moral law is then assigned a transcendental 
role, i.e. it accounts for how it is possible that there be such 
duties. Whether this does justice to the role of Kant’s 
formulations of the moral law as Categorical Imperative, in 
their use to assess compliance with the requirements of the 
moral law of types of action, is questionable. 
A related concern is that of specifying the exact nature of 
the ground of duty that provides the normative reason for 
action out of duty. It would appear that this ground should, 
for Stratton-Lake, amount to certain facts, e.g. that an agent 
needs help. In this way, Stratton-Lake can explain how the 
merely benevolent agent who is related emotionally to this 
fact, will be motivated to act, while the agent acting morally 
(whether benevolently or not), will be motivated by the duty 
which is made apparent through this fact. But here lies the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 This is in line with a dominant view in contemporary analytic philosophy 
of action, according to which justificatory (normative) reasons should be 
distinguished from explanatory (motivational) reasons (see Alvarez, 2010, for 
insightful analyses of reasons for action). 
KSO 2011: 
 
 
Christian Onof,  
Moral Worth and Inclinations in Kantian Ethics, 
KSO 2011: 116-161. 
Posted April 7, 2011 www.kantstudiesonline.net 
© 2011 Christian Onof & Kant Studies Online Ltd. 	  
147 
problem: if this fact is to act as the ground of duty, the 
dutiful requirement must be made apparent, i.e. the fact must 
be accompanied by an awareness of the constraints of the 
moral law, together with how they apply in this case. If 
would therefore seem, pace Stratton-Lake (2000:66) that the 
motivation cannot be grounded in a mere fact, but 
additionally, that the reasons must include the moral law.36 
This, however, as we have just seen, is the wrong kind of 
reason for Stratton-Lake. 
Whether or not Stratton-Lake’s account can address these 
issues, it is clear that his understanding of motivation is not 
Kant’s. He favours a belief-desire account of motivation as a 
psychological phenomenon, whereas for Kant, the free 
choice of incentive is made at the intelligible level. The 
problem we have just flagged, which is connected with 
running the two motivational accounts in parallel would, I 
contend, be dispelled if Kant’s dual empirical/intelligible 
account were used.37 I shall describe how Stratton-Lake’s 
proposal can be mapped onto this dual account. This 
mapping will have the additional benefit for the proposal in 
this paper that Stratton-Lake’s distinction between 
normative and motivational reasons shows how the Kantian 
dual empirical/intelligible account of action can be further 
understood in practical terms. 
The mapping works as follows. On the belief-desire 
model which can be applied to Kant’s empirical account of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Stratton-Lake (2000:66-67) wants to have any reference to the moral law 
confined to the secondary motive. This might deal with the vetoing power of 
duty when the proposed action is not permissible (although it does not 
provide an account of the nature of the choice that is the commitment to 
duty), but this is not enough to account for the action of the non-benevolent 
dutiful agent who has to construct his action from mere respect for the moral 
law. 
37 Note that when Stratton-Lake (2000:63) describes the motivational reasons 
for action out of duty, he says that ‘one takes oneself to have sufficient 
reason to do some obligatory act’, which recalls Allison’s emphasis, in the 
Incorporation Thesis, upon the ‘taking as’ that characterises the intelligible 
account as Kant views it. For Allison (1990:38), this characterizes ‘a model 
of deliberative rationality in terms of which choice involves (…) a taking as’. 
These activities are ‘expressions of spontaneity’ (ibid.), and represent the 
intelligible account of agency for Kant which is incompatibilist. 
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agency, an action is viewed as driven by the desire to 
achieve a certain end, given certain beliefs about the 
situation. That is, the action is understood as focused upon 
the end which provides its empirical normative reason.38 
The primary motive of the SL-DM account is therefore an 
empirical motive providing an empirical justification of the 
action. But the intelligible account of action has it that the 
action is motivated either by an Inclination which is (or 
underpins) the inclination I have to achieve this end, or by 
the duty which arises in this situation. The secondary motive 
of the SL-DM account, is therefore Kant’s notion of 
incentive, which makes sense insofar as the agent takes 
herself to be transcendentally free, i.e. as the originator of a 
new causal series, in her taking a motive as incentive for 
action.39 
With this mapping in place, Kant has a different account 
of the link between the empirical normative and 
motivational accounts than that suggested by Stratton-Lake. 
Stratton-Lake has it that the first provides the ground of 
duty, so that the primary motive given by the normative 
reasons defines the ground for the secondary motive which, 
either endorses—or not if this is not a proper ground—these 
reasons as explanatory reasons. Kant has the grounding 
relation going the other way. That is, the normative reasons 
are empirical facts that provide empirical grounds for action 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 I shall refer to “empirical” normativity when the justifications involved do 
not include any reference to the intelligible description of an action. 
39 The reader may have expected the mapping to go the other way, i.e. for the 
normative and motivational reasons to map onto the intelligible and empirical 
accounts respectively. Such a mapping would translate a not uncommon 
intuition that the intelligible account deals with the rational justification of 
action, while the empirical account deals with motives as psychological 
features of a belief-desire model. Such an interpretation would be congenial 
to compatibilist readings of Kant’s notion of freedom (Skorupski, 2009:163-
6; Rauscher, 2009:209-13). As regards this empirical account however, it 
ignores Kant’s theory of motivation, as expressed in the Incorporation Thesis. 
This clearly locates motivation at the intelligible level, in the choice of an 
incentive for action. As regards the intelligible account, in the next 
paragraph, I shall claim that this intelligible choice has a key role to play with 
respect to empirical normativity: it claims to ground it. There are thus both 
intelligible and empirical aspects to normativity, the first grounding the 
second. 
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on a belief-desire model of action insofar as the agent’s 
intelligible choice of duty as incentive endorses them as such 
(since the intelligible character is the cause of the empirical 
character).40 That is, the motivational reason provides an 
explanation of why the proposed empirical end of an action 
is indeed worth pursuing. The intelligible account of the 
nature of the motive chosen as incentive by the agent, 
provides what the agent takes as ground for the normativity 
governing his action in the realm of appearances (empirical 
normativity). Only if this incentive is duty, does this ground 
provide a valid justification; i.e. only when the agent 
chooses to act out of duty, 41 do the pursuits of his various 
specific ends have a valid ground.42 
This explanation converges towards Korsgaard’s (1996) 
own response to these Williams-type criticisms in which she 
disagrees with Nagel’s realism (1996:203) about reasons for 
action. As I understand her, Korsgaard would agree that the 
benevolent agents’ inclinations do not change because of the 
decision to consult their conformity to duty (Korsgaard, 
1996:244). What changes is what she calls the ‘principle of 
choice’ (op.cit.:243). For Korsgaard, the reason for action 
should be understood as the inclination ‘as seen from the 
perspective of the principle of choice’ (ibid.). This provides 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 The empirical normativity in question defines an obligation for the agent. 
As Korsgaard (1996:257) puts it, ‘there is a real sense in which you are 
bound by a law you make for yourself until you make another’.  On the 
present interpretation, this practical empirical normativity is connected to 
causal laws insofar as the part of the empirical character defined by this 
normative choice identifies causal laws of action on corresponding 
inclinations. Of course, as the empirical character is not fully unified by this 
choice, there are other parts of agent’s empirical character which will govern 
action that infringes this practical empirical normativity. 
41 In the act of choosing a motive to act upon, the agent takes an incentive as 
sufficient ground for action. This thereby provides a justification for the 
pursuit of whatever end this action is directed at. This justification is valid if 
this ground is duty. Otherwise the proposed norms do not fulfil the 
universality requirements (universality “in conception”, and universality in 
the will). 
42 The necessity and sufficiency of duty as valid ground for all empirical 
normativity is, in effect, the problem of the grounding of the moral law. For 
an examination of the problems arising from the claims of sufficiency as well 
as necessity, see Onof (2009). 
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further insight into how to interpret the way in which the 
choice of incentive at the intelligible level relates to the 
inclinations involved in agency. We have just seen how an 
interpretation of the SL-DM proposal leads to viewing the 
intelligible choice as providing a ground for the normativity 
of our action in the empirical world. Now Korsgaard’s 
interpretation brings out the sense in which normative 
reasons insofar as they are thus grounded, are viewed as 
reasons from the perspective of the agent’s intelligible 
choice.43 
This can also be put in the language of section II of 
GMM, empirical normativity is characterised by action on 
hypothetical imperatives characterising the belief-desire 
model.44 The only categorical imperatives are those enjoin-
ing the agent to act out of duty.45 To act on such an 
imperative involves the intelligible choice of the incentive of 
duty as ground of action (Incorporation Thesis). In thus 
grounding action, a categorical imperative provides a ground 
for all empirical normativity: any strings of mutually 
justifying hypothetical imperatives ‘Do X for the sake of Y’, 
‘Do Y for the sake of Z’46 are ultimately grounded in a 
categorical imperative ‘Do Z because it is your duty’ insofar 
as the moral law provides the only rationally valid 
justification for action according to Kant (GMM III – see the 
‘Reciprocity Thesis’ in Allison, 1996:207-210). These are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 The moral perspective is that of rational agents. For Korsgaard, this does 
not amount to a view from nowhere as Nagel would have it, because, as she 
puts it, ‘there is nothing that the world is like from nowhere’ (Korsgaard, 
1996:245n). Insofar as I claim that a proper ground is found in acting form 
the moral incentive, I am claiming more than a perspectival result: that is, the 
way in which the dutiful agent’s actions are grounded is right, not just right 
for him as rational agent. 
This distinction has consequences for Korsgaard’s description of the 
benevolent agent’s action – see footnote 56. 
44 A given desire defines an end E which is its satisfaction. The beliefs define 
empirical conditions C under which the agent takes herself to be acting. The 
hypothetical imperative then takes the form: ‘If C obtain, do X to achieve E’.  
45 Although Kant does state there is only one categorical imperative (the 
moral law), all maxims/principles of duty define categorical imperatives 
(Onof, 1998). 
46 Reference to the conditions C reflecting the agent’s beliefs about the situa-
tion is omitted here, as this only complicates the imperatives unnecessarily. 
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the only categorical imperatives, and therefore the only 
proper grounds for empirical normativity for Kant. 
Once this mapping of the SL-DM dual motivation 
account onto the empirical/intelligible account of action has 
been carried out, we can see how the empirical normative 
reasons involve subordinate inclinations: the end of the duti-
ful action is the object of a desire that is operative when the 
agent has certain beliefs. This is a subordinate inclination, 
precisely insofar as, at the intelligible level, the incentive for 
acting to achieve this end is duty. That is, this translation of 
Stratton-Lake’s account shows how it can easily accom-
modate action empirically driven by desires as morally 
worthy, as long as these desires are subordinate inclinations 
implementing the commands of duty. Such desires are thus 
controlled by duty which ensures that they do not lead one 
astray in certain circumstances (Baron, 1995:137). 
To return to Williams’s worry, these desires are interests 
in the realisation of certain ends. They remain at the core of 
the dutiful benevolent agent’s action, even if, insofar as the 
action is dutiful, they are operative only insofar as they 
implement the requirements of duty. To say that the focus of 
such action is the nature of the action, is to indicate that the 
end of the action is viewed as the end of an implementation 
of duty, whereby duty is chosen as the incentive.47 This 
conclusion is therefore the same as Herman’s, namely that 
when consulting duty, the agent’s interest only changes 
insofar as it is now an interest in the success of an action 
viewed as implementing duty (Herman, 1993:28). But, 
additionally, we now have an understanding of the role these 
ends play in defining the empirical normative reasons for the 
action, a normativity grounded in the choice of duty as an 
incentive. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Insofar as these inclinations are subordinated to duty, they contribute to the 
ends of duty, i.e. the ends of dutiful action. That is, they can contribute for 
instance to those obligatory ends identified by Kant in the Metaphysics of 
Morals: my perfection and the happiness of others (MM:385-388). 
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If we now consider the non-benevolent agent acting out 
of duty,48 his action must involve such desires on an em-
pirical account: the motive of duty can only be implemented 
in practice insofar as such empirical inclinations are opera-
tive. If no benevolent inclinations are operative when the 
agent in need of help is encountered, the motive of duty has 
to mobilise some (pre-existing, or new – see above). This 
however, will amount to defining an interest in the satis-
faction of certain ends.49 That is, the agent will have a 
concern for the success of his endeavour to provide help, 
which addresses an important aspect of Williams’s criticism. 
That is, it is not the case, as Williams understands it, that 
duty, for Kant, stands in opposition to an interest in provid-
ing help, as the wrong kind of reason for action. It is rather 
that, by acting out of duty, the non-benevolent agent will 
have an interest in providing help awoken by, or borne out 
of respect for, the moral law. This interest is manifested in 
the subordinate inclinations summoned by duty. Moreover, 
this action out of duty will give rise to some inclination to 
act in this way: this is how the compassionate inclinations 
Kant advocates (MM:457) will grow.50 
 
ven assuming a proponent of Williams’s views were 
prepared to go along with Kant’s dual empirical/intelligible 
account of agency —an unlikely assumption —it is probable 
that he would still find that this motivational account gives 
insufficient pride of place to the agent’s interest in the end of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 I am grateful to an anonymous referee whose comment led to my clarifying 
my thoughts on this issue. 
49 Such ends are however not necessarily “benevolent” ones: one can be 
interested in the success of one’s action of helping without experiencing any 
particular compassion for the needy agent. 
50 These are indeed benevolent inclinations since they amount to being 
inclined to help when a needy agent is encountered (compare with footnote 
40). It remains however an empirical issue as to how strong such benevolent 
inclinations are. In particular, how strong are they in comparison with other 
inclinations (e.g. misanthropy, laziness, …) which would oppose them in 
most circumstances. 
E 
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the action.51 To this, the Kantian can however reply, and go 
on the offensive, as it were. 
Indeed, recall that, as explained above, the inclinations we 
are dealing with here are relevant to the empirical 
description of the action. If they are not subordinated to duty, 
then this means that the agent is acting out of Inclination, as 
an incentive in the intelligible account of agency. This 
Inclination is incorporated into the agent’s principle/ maxim 
of action. Standardly, it is assumed that this is indeed the 
same as the inclination in its empirical form, and this is 
certainly a possible interpretation.52 However, Kant does tell 
us clearly that all action which is not out of duty has to be 
viewed as governed by an alternative principle (AA06: 23-
25), e.g. the principle of self-love. I take this to mean that the 
Inclination in question, however one wants to describe it, is 
ultimately always directed at oneself. And there are good 
grounds for making this identification.53 
For the benevolent man who does not consult duty, is 
ultimately acting on the grounds that the neediness of the 
other is unbearable to him, or on the grounds that this 
satisfies him/makes him happy.54 55 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 On the other hand, Stratton-Lake’s proposal would be more congenial to 
the Williams objection insofar as it gives pride of place to the normative 
reasons which define the primary motive. As I argued above, Stratton-Lake’s 
proposal is clearly distinct from Kant’s motivational account; it is, on the 
contrary, rather congenial to Ross’s denial that there can be any obligation to 
act out of any certain motive. 52	  This	  interpretation	  is	  certainly	  compatible	  with	  all	  that	  I	  have	  proposed	  so	  far.	  53	  Among	  those	  grounds,	  one	  could	  mention	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  avoids	  the	  problem	  of	  how	  an	  inclination	  defined	  in	  empirical	  terms	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  end	  could	  feature	  in	  an	  intelligible	  account	  of	  action.	  54	  This	  does	  not	   imply	  that	  Kant	  would	  deny	  the	  possibility	  of	  altruism.	  Kant	   distinguishes	   between	   the	   incentive	   prompting	   an	   action	   and	   its	  end.	   The	   end	   of	   the	   altruist’s	   action	   is	   the	   other’s	   welfare.	   But	   the	  incentive	  driving	  him	  has	   its	   roots	   in	  self-­‐love	   if	  his	  agency	   ignores	   the	  commands	   of	   duty.	   Korsgaard	   (1996:243)	   addresses	   a	   similar	   issue	   in	  response	   to	   Nagel’s	   criticism	   (1996:206).	   Namely,	   she	   claims	   that	   the	  benevolent	   agent	   does	  not	  want	   ‘to	   help	   others	   only	   because	   it	  pleases	  him	  to	  do	  so’,	  but	  rather	  that	  ‘he	  chooses	  to	  help	  others	  because	  he	  wants	  to’.	  This	  is	  right,	  but	  she	  does	  not	  spell	  out	  what	  the	  principle	  of	  choice	  is	  here.	  And	  clearly	  it	  is	  that	  one	  ought	  to	  do	  what	  one	  wants	  to	  do,	  i.e.	  it	  is	  a	  principle	  of	  self-­‐love.	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The answer to the criticism that the motivation of duty is 
not appropriate in certain situations can now be formulated 
very robustly: on a Kantian dichotomy of Inclination and 
duty as motives, it is only in the case of action out of duty 
that the other’s neediness features properly in my moti-
vation. 
 
 
The obligation to develop moral inclinations 
 
he examination of the case of a lack of morally 
favourable inclinations, or the presence of unfavour-
able inclinations has emphasised the need for the 
motive of duty to mobilise inclinations that will carry out its 
commands. On the account in terms of normative reasons, it 
is now apparent that this means that duty will have to foster 
a real interest in ends providing the agent with empirical 
normative reasons for his action.  
The interpretation proposed here therefore shows that any 
act out of duty involves, in its empirical description, 
inclinations (pre-existing or not) endorsed by duty and 
contributing to the ends of dutiful action. We thus have a 
duty to develop inclinations that are morally favourable, and 
to pursue corresponding ends. This is not a duty over and 
above our mere duty to act morally, but is an integral part of 
it, which follows analytically from the requirements of duty, 
together with the conditions for its empirical implement-
tation.56 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  This	  is	  one	  aspect	  of	  Kant’s	  point	  about	  the	  unreliability	  of	  inclinations	  (GMM:398):	  were	  the	  agent	  not	  to	  find	  this	  sight	  sufficiently	  unbearable,	  or	   not	   to	   be	   in	   state	   to	   experience	   the	   satisfaction/happiness	   from	  providing	  help,	  he	  may	  not	  be	  motivated	  to	  act	  to	  do	  so.	  
56 This claim can be given further substantiation. An action which makes use 
of subordinate inclinations is thereby more efficient. Here efficiency is 
understood as the ability to achieve the ends required by duty: insofar as 
pursuing one dutiful end implies others are not being pursued, efficiency in 
the pursuit of the ends of duty is a relevant dutiful concern. That is, there is 
an indirect duty to seek greater efficiency in carrying out our duty. 
On the present interpretation, the dutiful benevolent agent’s motive of duty 
can rely upon the action having been set out by the original prompting 
T 
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As discussed above, Kant introduces a duty to develop 
‘compassionate (…) feelings in us’ as an ‘indirect duty’ 
(MM:457).57 Of these feelings, he says that one can ‘make 
use of them as so many means to sympathy based on moral 
principles’ (MM:457; see also AA08:337-8), which strongly 
suggests the subordinate role of such inclinations and their 
corresponding ends which is proposed in this paper. In this 
subordinate role, these inclinations support duty, so that 
Kant can describe them as doing ‘what the representation of 
duty alone would not accomplish’ (MM:457). 
 
n this final section of the paper, I would like to examine 
how this indirect duty to develop compassionate feelings 
strongly suggests the appropriateness of the interpretation of 
the role of inclinations proposed in this paper, and the 
inadequacy of the standard picture. The standard interpreta-
tion has it that this duty follows from the fact that we ought 
to facilitate our fulfilling our duty in the face of contrary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
inclination: this inclination will already have specified in a fair amount of 
detail exactly what is required, because an inclination is directed to a 
particular end. With inclination doing this work, duty does not therefore have 
the task of “constructing” an action from scratch. Such a task will be all the 
more challenging to fulfil, the less subordinate inclinations can be called 
upon to specify the detail of the action. 
There is another aspect of this efficiency provided by inclinations. As we 
noted above, to do one’s duty, one must first be able to recognise what it is. 
As Herman (1993:77-93) explains, this requires us to be receptive to moral 
salience. Such receptivity is in fact best achieved through the availability of 
subordinate inclinations. This can be seen by noting that, in our example, 
grasping the neediness of the other agent is not merely grasping a state of 
affairs. It is also the grasp of some ‘ought’, which is not yet the ‘ought’ of 
duty. It is a grasp of how things ‘ought’ to be if the other’s end were to be 
realised. In principle, an agent could have such a grasp without any emotional 
attachment to an improvement in the other’s condition. That is, this would be 
grasped merely cognitively, as a fact. This is, typically, characteristic of the 
non-benevolent dutiful agent. But this is not efficient, as the extreme case of	  
Asperger’s syndrome suggests: the afflicted agent experiences no such 
attachments, and as a result, has to learn to recognise non-affectively what 
others would find appropriate or desirable in a large number of standard 
situations.  
57 Unlike Timmermann (2007:36), I take an indirect duty to follow from 
direct duties as an analytical consequence of the truth of the synthetic a priori 
truths which these direct duties amount to. 
I 
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inclinations (e.g. Baron, 1995:218; Allison, 1996:122).58 
This would make it into a sort of meta-duty. But how, on the 
standard interpretation which sees no role for inclinations in 
relation to moral worth, can there be a duty to develop 
inclinations of any sort? If any favourable inclinations such 
as the ones Kant enjoins us to develop, were available, they 
could not, on this standard account, make any difference to 
an action’s moral worth. 
An obvious response here would seem to be that, with 
such inclinations, the agent is more likely to act out of duty. 
This suggests that what is at stake is making it possible for 
there to be more morally worthy actions. There are, 
however, no grounds in Kant’s ethics for thinking that the 
quantity of morally worthy actions is a measure of moral 
worth, and/or should constitute an end of duty. The category 
of quantity is not appropriate here. 
Recalling that Kant assigns no moral worth to the agent 
who is endowed with sympathetic inclinations (GMM:398), 
it is clear that  what is valuable cannot be the possession of 
such inclinations.59 And indeed, the duty is to ‘cultivate the 
compassionate natural (…) feelings in us’ (MM:457). 
Acquiring these inclinations is therefore what is of value. 
Now we must ask what is it about this acquisition that is 
morally worthy? A plausible answer is that willing this 
acquisition is morally worthy. Indeed, this would amount to 
the claim that duty commands us to will (for the future) 
further dutiful action. And the only way this would seem to 
be possible, insofar as my future choice is not something I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Baron (1995:218) interprets the role of inclinations as that of providing a 
boost to our motivation to act dutifully. This implies an understanding of 
motivation which is incompatible with the Incorporation Thesis. 
Interestingly, however, Baron’s solution to avoid an impure will is to 
interpret the role of inclinations as making us sensitive to the needs of others 
to help us carry out our broad duty of charity. This is certainly part of the 
story, as Allison (1996:122) also points out. But it cannot account for Kant’s 
emphasis upon overcoming the pernicious influence of inclinations that 
oppose our acting dutifully (MM:457).   
59 I am assuming here that the unreliability of these inclinations is not the 
only ground for their unsuitability as incentives. 
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can decide upon now, would be to facilitate such future 
dutiful action. If this seems right, is it the whole story? 
Consider a possible world in which the understanding of 
neurological processes is such that it is possible to inhibit 
certain types of feelings and enhance certain dispositions.60 
In this world, would we have a duty to undergo treatment 
which could alter our inclinations neurologically? This 
would, after all, be the most efficient way of fulfilling the 
duty to acquire the right kind of inclinations. 
I think that this ‘Brave New World’ duty would not be 
endorsed by Kant. The reason is that ‘cultivating’ is a key 
part of the duty. It is therefore not just the acquisition, but 
also the cultivation of these inclinations that is morally 
worthy. In a ‘Brave New World’, if the single decision of 
undergoing the inclination altering treatment were our duty, 
it is hard to see how Kant could, at the same time, pour so 
much praise upon the non-benevolent unsympathetic dutiful 
agent (GMM: 398). What impresses Kant is the moral 
fitness of this agent’s motive, which is exercised when it has 
to overcome conflicting inclinations. Thus he refers to the 
unsympathetic agent as giving ‘himself a far higher worth’ 
(GMM: 398) than his sympathetic counterpart. This can 
only be because the overcoming of adverse inclinations is 
morally worthy. But since it is not the action itself which is 
thereby more morally worthy, as we saw above, it has to be 
the agent. It is noteworthy that Kant also talks of cultivating 
‘one’s natural predispositions’ (MM:387) as an aspect of the 
duty to perfect oneself. Although he does not mention 
sympathetic inclinations here, once their development has 
been identified as a duty (MM:457), it seems natural to 
include them among the predispositions that are to be 
cultivated as part of the duty to perfection. 
If such cultivation of inclinations is therefore crucially 
part of the duty to develop sympathetic inclinations, the 
standard interpretation which excludes inclinations from any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Considering what is currently possible with drugs and stimulation through 
electrodes, such a world is not obviously very alien to us. 
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role in moral worth does not seem adequate to explain this 
duty. On the account proposed in this paper, this duty is 
fulfilled through the agent’s moral worth insofar as the 
inclinations acquired and strengthened by the agent, are just 
manifestations of this worth in the realm of appearances. 
Therefore, this duty just is that of the moral progress 
discussed above, which reflects the agent’s moral worth in 
the world of appearances over time, a duty which can be 
seen as an aspect of the duty to perfection (MM: 385-7). 
Moreover, the importance of developing these 
inclinations oneself shows how the agent’s ownership of 
such inclinations plays a key role. That is, the ‘Brave New 
World’ inclinations obtained by treatment are problematic 
precisely to the extent that the agent does not have 
authorship of them. And since they have not either been 
acquired through the developmental process of education, 
the agent will not really own them. I think this sheds 
additional light upon the need for the practical notion of self 
introduced at the outset in this paper. 
Further, the agent’s development of his inclinations 
enables us to identify a notion of one’s identity which is 
narrower than this practical conception of self we started 
with. Those inclinations which I have consciously fostered 
and developed stand for an identity which I aspire to, while 
it is no doubt the case that there are other inclinations I also 
act upon which do not fit in with my conception of that 
identity. This means that the moral progress in question is 
defined by a conception of the agent’s practical identity 
which is an object of aspiration. This teleological conception 
of the agent’s practical identity addresses any concerns one 
may have had that the practical notion of self was very broad 
in its inclusion of all active inclinations.61Korsgaard (1996: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 See footnote 7. Note a parallel with Korsgaard (1996:238) who develops 
her grounding of normativity around a conception of one’s identity. This does 
lead to some ambiguity however, as to how the ‘better person’ which this 
identity encapsulates can both be ‘an object of aspiration and identification’. 
This seems to result from the problems encountered when ignoring the dual 
empirical/intelligible accounts of agency. This duality enables one to see 
one’s Gesinnung as defining one’s moral progress in the empirical world. 
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238-9) shows that grounds for a narrower notion of identity 
defined by those inclinations which are ‘more deeply our 
own’ can be found in Kant (e.g. in his ‘Conjectures on the 
Beginning of Human History’) and expresses surprise at the 
fact that ‘Kant didn’t take up this question’ of the agent’s 
identification with such inclinations. I think that with the 
duty to develop sympathetic inclinations, Kant partly 
addresses this issue on the present interpretation. 
In any case, without such a notion, i.e. if the self were 
characterised exclusively by the power of rational choice, 
the possibility of morally worthy action, as viewed from the 
perspective of an empirical account, would be dependent 
upon the availability of inclinations or the ability to develop 
some, both of which would be contingent features of the 
agent’s self.62 This would leave practical rationality in a 
situation akin to that of theoretical reason whose cognitive 
power is limited by the need for a sensible manifold to be 
intuited for a given concept: just as an intuition of a manifold 
is required for a concept to refer to an object, thereby 
defining limits to human knowledge, inclinations would be 
the “other” of rationality, that which limits its pretensions. 
However, practical rationality, for Kant, knows no such 
bounds: as a result, a practical conception of the self has to 
take into account the existence of inclinations which 
characterise it, and which its power of rational choice is able 
to control. That is why Kant describes the Doctrine of Virtue 
as addressed to human beings, i.e. not holy beings, but 
beings who are conscious of their ‘capacity to master one’s 
inclinations when they rebel against the law’ (MM:383). 
The practical determination of the self which this amounts 
to, is a notion for which other grounds can be adduced in 
Kant’s critical philosophy (Onof, 2010). This conception of 
self in turn vindicates a notion of moral worth of the agent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 It would still be possible to will to act dutifully, but the possibility of 
implementation of any action defined by this willing would be dependent 
upon contingent circumstances lying beyond the self understood as the power 
of free rational choice.  
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that is reflected in the inclinations she endorses and 
develops, as this paper has proposed.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
n conclusion, in this paper, I have proposed the 
introduction of a practical conception of self which is 
characterised both by inclinations and by the freedom to 
alter them (part A). I have shown that inclinations that are 
subordinated to duty contribute to morally worthy action 
(part B). These subordinate inclinations provide a mark, in 
the realm of appearances, of the agent’s moral worth (part 
C). They are directed to empirical ends which duty endorses 
as worthy of pursuit (part D). The development of 
subordinate inclinations, which involves the adoption of 
such ends, is a manifestation of an agent’s moral progress, 
and as such it constitutes an indirect duty. 
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